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Protecting the Elderly: The New
Paternalism
By JOHN J. REGAN*
A new public policy supporting and promoting government in-
tervention in the lives of the elderly has gathered momentum over
the past decade. These services, often known as "Adult Protective
Services," were developed in response to several trends in the liv-
ing patterns of older people. First, because the elderly make up an
increasingly larger percentage of the population,1 social programs
designed to benefit them have attracted increasing attention from
legislators and social planners. While the number of persons sixty-
five and over is growing, the number of persons living to age sev-
enty-five and beyond is increasing dramatically.2 This group, the
oldest of the old, often has one or more health, social, economic, or
environmental problems that may require supportive services.
Moreover, the presence of a family to care for an elder living at
home is proving to be no guarantee that the aged person will re-
ceive attentive care. The phenomenon of "elder abuse" has joined
child abuse and the battered spouse as an example of the disinte-
grating family in modern society.3
The recent trend towards "deinstitutionalization" of mental
health care has provided another source of elderly candidates for
these social programs. Many states, motivated by changes in phi-
* Dean and Professor of Law, Hofstra Law School. B.A., 1951, Mary Immaculate Col-
lege; J.D., 1960, L.L.M., 1971, J.S.D., 1977, Columbia Law School.
1. At the beginning of 1980, 11.2% of the population-about 25,000,000 persons-was
age 65 or older. Between 1970 and 1979, the number of persons age 65 or older increased
23.5%, while those under 65 rose by only 6.3%. SENATE SPECIAL COMM. ON AGING, DEVELop-
MENTS IN AGING, 1979 (pt. I), S. REP. No. 613, 96th Cong., 2d Sess. xv-xvi (1980).
2. R. BUTLER & M. Lawis, AGING AND MENTAL HEALTH 5 (1977); FE. COUNCIL ON AG-
ING, PUBLIC POLICY AND THE FRAIL ELDERLY 16 (1978). In 1975, 38% of the elderly popula-
tion was age 75 or older. The group of persons who were age 85 or older constituted 8% of
the elderly population. Id.
3. See generally Elder Abuse, Joint Hearing before the Senate Special Comm. on
Aging and the House Select Comm. on Aging, 96th Cong., 2d Sess. (1980).
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losophy of treatment and by fiscal problems, have discharged large
numbers of elderly mental patients from state mental hospitals
into nursing homes or into the community.4 At the same time, ad-
missions of similar persons to these hospitals have been severely
curtailed.5 A parallel need for community-based support services
for the developmentally disabled has also emerged.8
. These elderly persons usually desire to live in the community,
not in a nursing home or mental hospital, but cannot cope with the
demands of day-to-day life'because of physical incapacity or
mental disability. Abuse or exploitation by others or self-neglect
are the frequent result of such frailties,7 leading in turn to more
extensive disability, admission to a nursing home or hospital, or
even premature death. Lack of adequate community support for
such persons when their frailties first develop inevitably leads to
higher human, economic, and social costs.
In response to these problems, many states have recently en-
acted Adult Protective Services legislation, a phrase borrowed from
the child protection area.8 These laws have created a coordinated
system of social and health services, which include visiting nurses,
homemakers, repair persons, visitors, and home-delivered meals.
These services are coordinated by a caseworker who, after assess-
ing each client's needs, is responsible for arranging for the delivery
of appropriate services through other agencies. Federal funding for
such programs is available through Subchapter XX of the Social
-Security Act 9 and Subchapter IH of the Older Americans Act.10
4. SENATE SPECIAL COMM. ON AGING, NURSING HOME CARE m THE UmTED STATES: FAIL-
uRE IN PUBLIC POLICY, SUPPORTING PAPER No. 7, THE ROLE OF NURSING HoMEs IN CARING
FOR DISCHARGED MENTAL PATIENTS (AND THE BIRTH OF A FOR-PRoFTr BOARDING HOME INauS-
TRY), 94th Cong., 2d Sess. 718 (Comm. Print 1976). See also HOUSE SELCT Cop.u ON AGING,
NATIONAL CONFERENCE ON' MENTAL HEALTH AND THE ELDERLY, 96th Cong., 1st Sess. (Comm.
Print 1979); Donahue, What About Our Responsibility Toward the Abandoned Elderly?, 18
THE GERONTOLOGIST 102 (1978).
5. MENTAL HEALTH CARE AND THE ELDERLY: SHORTCOMINGS IN PUBLIC POLIC, A RE-
PORT BY THE SENATE SPECIAL COMM. ON AGING, 92d Cong., 1st Sess. 8 (1971).
6. See Pennhurst State School & Hosp. v. Halderman, 101 S. Ct 1531 (1981).
7. DEs'T OF HEALTH, EDUCATION & WELFARE, MENTAL HEALTH AND THE COMMITTE ON
MENTAL ILLNESS OF THE ELDERLY 40 (1979).
8. For a discussion of the development of this trend, see J. REGAN & G. SPRINGER,
PROTECTIVE SERVICES FOR THE ELDERLY-A WORKING PAPER PREPARED FOR THE SENATE SPE-
CIAL COMM. ON AGING, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. (Comm. Print 1977) [hereinafter cited as REGAN
& SPRINGER]; Regan, Protective Services for the Elderly: Commitment, Guardianship and
Alternatives, 13 WM. & MARY L. REV. 569 (1972).
9. 42 U.S.C. §§ 1397-1397f (1976 & Supp. m1 1979). One of the purposes of this section
of the Social Security Act is to furnish services for "preventing or remedying neglect, abuse,
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Protective services programs are rarely limited to clients who
voluntarily accept their services. The legislative scheme often pro-
vides for the use of guardianship or conservatorship by the protec-
tive services agency to ensure that the client accepts the assistance
that the caseworker believes is necessary. Some states also have
created special court procedures to secure court orders for protec-
tive services, for placing the client in an institution, for emergency
orders when there is imminent danger to the client's health or
safety, or for orders authorizing entry into an uncooperative cli-
ent's home. Moreover, some states have authorized state agencies
to serve as "public guardians." These public guardians are ap-
pointed by the courts to provide guardianship services to persons
for whom no private guardian can be found.
This Article examines the effect on the elderly of increasing
Adult Protective Services legislation. The Article first summarizes
the traditional methods of legal intervention in the lives of the eld-
erly-civil commitment and guardianship. Because of the inade-
quacies of these methods, the due process model of intervention
evolved, forming the theoretical basis underlying many of the cur-
rent Adult Protective Services programs. Next, the Article analyzes
the legislation enacted in eleven states, revealing serious procedu-
ral shortcomings, vague and inappropriate standards for identify-
ing who shall receive protective services, and little accountability
on the part of the public agencies that administer the services. De-
spite these problems, the Article concludes that reforming existing
statutes by circumscribing the use of involuntary intervention is a
more desirable alternative than following the abolitionist command
to eliminate adult protective services.
Traditional Commitment and Guardianship
Procedures
Adult protective services programs are circumscribed by the
legal authority of an intervenor to impose a decision on an unwill-
ing individual. The Anglo-American legal system traditionally has
authorized such intervention through either civil commitment or
guardianship proceedings. Grounded in the state's police power,
civil commitment proceedings affect persons adjudged to be dan-
or exploitation of children and adults unable to protect their own interests." Id. § 1397.
10. Id. §§ 3021-3030.
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gerous to others or to themselves as a result of mental illness.
These individuals are sent, either by the signed order of two or
three physicians or by court order, to a state mental hospital for
care and treatment.1' The guardianship procedure, resting on the
state's parens patriae power, enables a court to appoint a surro-
gate decisionmaker for persons found to be incompetent. 12 The
guardian is authorized to manage the ward's person and property;
the extent of the management depends on the court's finding on
the extent of the ward's need for help. By extension of the parens
patriae power, some states have authorized the commitment of
mentally ill persons who are in need of care and treatment but who
do not pose any danger to anyone. 3 By the end of the 1960's, both
types of statutes generally contained standards and procedures de-
veloped a half century earlier, although a few states had already
begun comprehensive revisions of their civil commitment laws.' 4
The major inadequacies of the traditional guardianship stat-
utes took various forms. 15 The standards for determining incompe-
tency were vague and phrased in inappropriate terms. Often the
court procedures failed to provide for adequate notice to the pro-
posed ward, the presence of the person at the hearing, adequate
representation by counsel, or trial by jury.'6 A guardian with an
identifiable conflict of interest frequently was given control over
the ward by a judge who did little more than concur in the con-
clusory testimony of the petitioner's expert psychiatric witness
that the person was incompetent. 7 Complete power over the
ward's estate and person was transferred to the guardian, regard-
11. See generally AMERIcAN BAR FOUNDATION, THE MENTALLY DISABLED AND THE LAW
17-65 (S. Brakel & R. Rock rev. ed. 1971) [hereinafter cited as AmF.RicAN BAR FOUNDATION];
Note, Developments in the Law-Civil Commitment of the Mentally Ill, 87 HARv. L. REv.
1190, 1265-71 (1974).
12. AMERICAN BAR FOUNDATION, supra note 11, at 260.
13. See N. KrrrRE, THE RIGHT TO B, DIFEa NT: DEVIANCE AND ENFORcEn THERAPY 66
(1971).
14. Note, Developments in the Law-Civil Commitment of the Mentally Ill, 87
HARv. L. REv. 1190, 1205-06 (1974).
15. See generally Horstman, Protective Services for the Elderly: The Limits of
Parens Patriae, 40 Mo. L. REv. 215 (1975) [hereinafter cited as Horstman]; Mitchell, The
Objects of Our Wisdom and Our Coercion: Involuntary Guardianship for Incompetents,
52 S. CAL. L. REv. 1405 (1979); Regan, Protective Services for the Elderly: Commitment,
Guardianship, and Alternatives, 13 Wm. & MARY L. REv. 569, 602 (1972).
16. See Mitchell, The Objects of Our Wisdom and Our Coercion: Involuntary Guardi-
anship for Incompetents, 52 S. CAL. L. REv. 1405, 1415-19 (1979).
17. See Alexander, Surrogate Management of The Property of the Aged, 21 SYRACUSE
L. REv. 87, 169-73 (1969).
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less of the ward's ability to handle some of these decisions inde-
pendently. In many cases, the costs of the guardianship over sev-
eral years completely depleted the assets of smaller estates."'
Furthermore, legal authority for dealing with elderly persons
in crisis situations often was uncertain. State mental health laws
typically permit emergency civil commitment to a mental health
facility on the certificate of two physicians.19 This procedure is not
applicable to medical emergencies; however, if a person is uncon-
scious and in need of medical treatment, physicians may provide
care on a common law theory of implied consent-a presumption
that the ordinary person wants the medical care necessary to avoid
death or to treat serious injury or disease.20 Neither of these legal
mechanisms is appropriate for cases of older persons who, as a re-
sult of deteriorating mental faculties and physical health, seriously
neglect themselves or suffer abuse or exploitation by others.
The Development of the Due Process Model
As awareness of the needs of the elderly developed during the
early 1970's and the first adult services programs appeared, pro-
posals to reform the anachronistic legal procedures for civil com-
mitment and guardianship to conform to the requirements of due
process were suggested. 1 It was proposed that the guardianship
proceeding be made adversarial and include requirements for ade-
quate notice, opportunity for presence at the hearing, a high stan-
dard of evidentiary proof, and the right to counsel-whether pri-
vate or appointed.22 The use of professional screening teams to
assist the court in assessing the needs of the client was proposed,
23
18. ABA Committee on Problems Relating to Persons Under Disability, Conservator-
ship: Present Practice and Uniform Probate Code Compared, 5 REAL PROP., PROB. & TR. J.
507, 517 (1970).
19. See, e.g., N.Y. MENTAL HYG. LAW § 9.27 (McKinney 1978). See also Note, Devel-
opments in the Law-Civil Commitment of the Mentally Ill, 87 HARv. L. REV. 1190, 1267-
68 (1974).
20. See, e.g., Cobbs v. Grant, 8 Cal. 3d 229, 243, 502 P.2d 1, 10, 104 Cal. Rptr. 505, 514
(1972); Wheeler v. Barker, 92 Cal. App. 2d 776, 785, 208 P.2d 68, 74 (1948).
21. REGAN & SPRINGER, supra note 8, at 40-41; DEVELOPMENTAL DisABrrriEs STATE
LEGISLATIVE PROJECT OF THE ABA COMMISSION ON THE MENTALLY DISABLED, GUARDIANSHIP
AND CONSERVATORSHIP: STATUTORY SURVEY AND MODEL STATUTE 2 (1979).
22. REGAN & SPRINGER, supra note 8, at 39; Horstman, supra note 15, at 236-59; Task
Panel on Legal and Ethical Issues, Mental Health and Human Rights: Report of the Task
Panel on Legal and Ethical Issues, 20 ARIz. L. REV. 49, 76 (1978).
23. REGAN & SPRINGER, supra note 8, at 48-50; Chambers, Alternatives to Civil Coin-
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and it was recommended that the standards for determining
whether a guardian was needed emphasize functional disabilities
rather than mental disorder."
Following the principle of the least restrictive alternative, the
due process model ,suggests that guardians be given only the lim-
ited powers necessary to provide for the client's demonstrated
needs.25 It was advocated that the client's preferences in selecting
a guardian should receive high priority,2 and if no relative or
friend were available and willing to serve, private social agencies
and even public agencies could be appointed as guardians subject
to special controls.27 Proposals to ensure greater accountability of
the guardian stressed requirements to submit regular reports to
the court and to demonstrate periodically the continued need for
the guardianship.28 Special emergency intervention proceedings
were proposed to fill the gaps in the current law.29
Against this background of "due process" reform proposals,
the states began to enact protective services legislation. Since 1973,
eleven state legislatures have established new procedures for invol-
untary intervention in the specific context of an adult protective
services program.30 In addition, many other states have authorized
their social services agencies to provide protective services, but
have made no special provisions for involuntary intervention and
thus rely on existing guardianship law to supply the needed
authority.
31
mitment of the Mentally Ill: Practical Guides and Constitutional Imperatives, 70 MICH.
L. REV. 1107, 1172-77 (1972).
24. REGAN & SPRINGER, supra note 8, at 37; Horstman supra note 15, at 227-28.
25. See REGAN & SPRINGER, supra note 8, at 40; Horstman, supra note 15, at 267.
26. See PROPOSED GUARDIANSHIP AND CONSERVATORSHIP STATUTE § 5-311, reprinted in
LEGAL RESEARCH AND SERVICES FOR THE ELDERLY, A HANDBOOK OF MODEL STATE STATUTES
130 (1971).
27. See REGAN & SPRINGER, supra note 8, at 41.
28. Id. at 50.
29. Id. at 42.
30. See ALA. CODE §§ 38-9-1 to -11 (Supp. 1980); CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. §§ 46a-14 to -
25 (West Supp. 1980); MD. ANN. CODE art. 88A §§ 106-110 (1979); MD. EST. & TRUSTS CODE
ANN. §§ 13-704 to -710 (Supp. 1980); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 161-D:1-:6, 464-A1-:43 (Supp.
1979); N.C. GEN. STAT. §§ 108-102 to -106.8 (1978 & Supp. 1979); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 43A,
H9 801-810 (West 1979 & Supp. 1980); S.C. CODE §§ 43-29-10 to -100 (1976 & Supp. 1980);
TENN. CODE ANN. §§ 14-25-101 to -113 (1980); UTAH CODE ANN. §§ 55-19-1 to -9 (Supp.
1979); Wis. STAT. ANN. §§ 55.001-.07 (West Supp. 1980).
31. E.g., N.Y. Soc. SERV. LAW § 131 (McKinney Supp. 1980).
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State Protective Services Legislation
The dominant statutory theme in the majority of the eleven
states that have enacted special intervention legislation is to create
special court proceedings for authorizing involuntary intervention,
instead of using regular guardianship proceedings to achieve the
same goal.3 2 The new proceeding may lead to an order for protec-
tive services, for protective placement, or for emergency services,
all of which are to be implemented by a public social services
agency.
The trend towards special proceedings that bypass guardian-
ship poses a serious threat to the personal and property rights of
the clients who are the subjects of these proceedings. First, the
new proceedings frequently fail to incorporate adequate procedural
protection for the client. Second, the standards by which the
courts determine whether the client needs involuntary assistance
often are vague and inappropriate. Finally, once an order is




Most of the eleven states that have established special pro-
ceedings for the issuance of protective services orders make little
or no reference to procedures designed to protect the client. Typi-
cally, no mention is made of requirements for notice to the client
of the filing of the petition, the client's presence at the hearing, the
person's right to counsel, or an evidentiary standard of proof.33 In
such circumstances, there is great danger that the hearing may be-
come a public agency's ex parte presentation of testimony to a
sympathetic court that will routinely issue protective services or-
ders exactly as requested by the agency.
In some states, limited, although not entirely adequate, pro-
tection is afforded the elderly client in the special proceedings. For
example, notice requirements varying from "some notice" to five or
32. See ALA. CODE § 38-9-4(a) (Supp. 1980); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 410.103(2) (West Supp.
1980); N.C. GEN. STAT. ANN. tit. 43A, § 807 (1979); S.C. CODE § 43-29-20 (1976); TENN. CODE
ANN. § 14-25-107(b)(1) (Supp. 1980); UTAH CODE ANN. § 55-19-5 (Supp. 1979).
33. See, e.g., ALA. CODE § 38-9-4(a) (Supp. 1980); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 410.103(2) (West
Supp. 1980); S.C. CODE § 43-29-30,-70,-80 (Supp. 1979).
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ten days notice are imposed;" no state, however, addresses the
problem of the confused client who may not appreciate the terms
or importance of the legal document conveying such notice. These
same states also provide for the client to be present at the hearing.
Only one state, however, discourages an inference of waiver of this
right from a client's nonappearance by requiring a physician to
certify in writing that the client is unable to attend the hearing 5
Similarly, while North Carolina and Utah mandate a showing of
incompetency by clear and convincing evidence, 6 the other states'
failure to prescribe any evidentiary standards increases the risk
that many courts will apply an overly flexible measure in deter-
mining the need for protective services. The only major safeguard
for the client in this group of states is the requirement that counsel
be appointed for indigents. In Tennessee, this right is extended to
any person incapable of waiving counsel.37 Even under Tennessee's
broad standard for the right to counsel, however, the legislature's
failure to define the duties of counsel in this proceeding may lead
many attorneys to function as guardians ad litem, doing what they
believe is in the best interest of the client, rather than contesting
the petition as an adversary.
Few limits are imposed on the agencies that provide services
after a court order is obtained. Protective services are so broadly
defined in many statutes that they may encompass virtually any
kind of social or health service, including property management
and medical care. 8 If, therefore, the court does not limit the ser-
vices, the agency is virtually free to do as it wishes with the client.
Moreover, the statutes do not impose on the public agency an ex-
plicit fiduciary obligation similar to that ordinarily stipulated for a
guardian or conservator. The agency is not held by statute to act in
34. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 108-106.2(b) (1978) (five days); TENN. CODE ANN. § 14-25-107(b)
(Supp. 1980) (ten days); UTAH CODE ANN. § 55-19-5(b) (Supp. 1979) (five days).
35. UTAH CODE ANN. § 55-19-4(4)(b) (Supp. 1979).
36. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 108-106.2(c) (Supp. 1979);-UTAH CODE ANN. § 55-19-5(2) (Supp.
1979).
37. TENN. CODE ANN. § 14-25-107(b) (Supp. 1980).
38. See, e.g., ALA. CODE § 38-9-2(9) (Supp. 1980) ("[t]hose services whose objective is
to protect an incapacitated person from himself and from others"); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 108-
104(n) (1978) ("services provided by the State or other government or private organization
or individuals are necessary to protect the disabled adult from abuse, neglect, or exploita-
tion"; such services "shall consist of evaluation of the need for service and mobilization of
essential services on behalf of the disabled adult"); TENN. CODE ANN. § 14-25-102(9) (Supp.
1980) ("services aimed at preventing and remedying abuse, neglect, and exploitation").
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the best interests of the client or to determine how the client could
act if competent. Rather, the agency's only duty appears to be to
provide the services authorized in the court order, more or less in
an "arm's length" relationship with the client.
The agency's relationship with the client also is strictly imper-
sonal. The statutes typically permit the court authorization to be
directed to the "department" or the "director" to provide ser-
vices.39 There is no requirement that specific individuals within an
agency develop a personal relationship with the client, and nothing
to prevent the client from being shifted from one caseworker to
another at the whim of the agency. The highly personal and indi-
vidualized nature of the decisions required for protective services
clients, however, demands something closer to the one-to-one rela-
tionship characteristic of a regular guardianship.
An agency's power to change the residence of the client, and
therefore to institutionalize the person, causes special concern. A
protective services order can result in the transfer of the person to
a hospital, a nursing home, a boarding home, or even to a mental
hospital. The classic Blenkner study ° indicated that institutional-
ization was often the remedy chosen by the protective agency;
those institutionalized, however, suffered a higher frequency of
deaths than did a similar group of protected persons who remained
in their communities.41 The principle of the "least restrictive alter-
native" thus suggests that institutionalization should be used only
as a last resort.'2
Despite the potentially serious, adverse consequences of insti-
tutionalization, the problem is not addressed in many of the statu-
tory schemes. The Oklahoma statute is alone in expressing a pref-
erence for leaving clients in their present living accommodations.' 3
39. E.g:, ALA. CODE § 38-9-2(10) (Supp. 1980) (Department of Pensions and Security);
N.C. GEN. STAT. § 108-104(c) (1978) (Director of County Department of Social Services);
S.C. CODE § 43-29-10(8) (1976) (Department of Social Services).
40. M. BLENKNER, FNAL REPORT, PROTECTIVE SERVICES FOR OLDER PEOPLE (1974).
41. Id. at 132, 142-45.
42. See Shelton v. Tucker, 364 U.S. 479, 488 (1960); Lessard v. Schmidt, 349 F. Supp.
1078, 1095-96 (E.D. Wis. 1972), vacated and remanded for a more specific injunctive order,
414 U.S. 473 (1974). See generally Chambers, Alternatives to Civil Commitment of the
Mentally Ill: Practical Guides and Constitutional Imperatives, 70 MICH. L. REv. 1107
(1972).
43. "Whenever it is consistent with the welfare and safety of the elderly person, the
court shall authorize that involuntary protective services be administered to the elderly per-
son in his or her present living accommodations." OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 43A, § 807(b) (West
1979).
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Four of the remaining states having protective services legislation
make statutory reference to placement in institutions,44 with three
of these four requiring special court findings to justify a transfer of
residence.45 In Wisconsin, however, the heavy statutory emphasis
on placement rather than delivery of services suggests that the en-
tire protective services system is, in reality, a protective placement
system. One study found that, in 1978, Wisconsin recorded a total
of 1,050 protective placement petitions, compared with only 61
protective services petitions in North Carolina, whose population
exceeds that of Wisconsin by 850,000.46 The same study noted also
that known instances of judicially ordered services, as distinct from
placement, were rare in Wisconsin. 4
Once an order for protective services is issued, the court re-
tains no further responsibility towards the client, although the or-
der generally is of indefinite duration. The agency need not file
periodic reports about the client's status or condition, nor is it re-
quired to seek renewal of the order. The client thus can become
the agency's ward for as long as the agency cares to stay involved,
which often will be as long as program funds continue.
Emergency Intervention
Protective services or protective placement orders generally
are directed towards clients who are judged to need substantial as-
sistance in performing the tasks of daily living, but are not in dan-
ger of immediate injury or death. To meet the urgent needs of
those individuals who appear to be in danger of immediate injury
or death, eight of the eleven states that have enacted protective
services legislation separate from traditional civil commitment and
guardianship proceedings have established special court proceed-
ings for emergency intervention.48 There is wide variation, how-
44. ALA. CODE § 38-9-6(c) (Supp. 1980); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 410.104(2) (West Supp.
1980); S.C. CODE § 43-29-30(2) (Supp. 1979); Wis. STAT. ANN. § 55.06(9)(a) (West Supp.
1980). See also OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 43A, § 808(F)(1)(b) (West 1979).
45. See ALA. CODE § 38-9-6(c) (Supp. 1980); FLA. STAT. AN. § 410.104(2) (West Supp.
1980); S.C. CODE § 43-29-30(1) (Supp. 1979).
46. M. AxELBuND, EXERCISING JUDGMENT FOR THE DISABLED (ExEcurIVE SUMMARY) 12
(1979).
47. Id.
48. See ALA. CODE § 38-9-5 (Supp. 1980); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 410.104 (West Supp.
1980); MD. ANN. CODE art. 88A, § 109(b) (1979); MD. EST. & TRUSTS CODE ANN. § 13-709
(Supp. 1980); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 108-106.3 (1978); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 43A, § 808 (West
1979); S.C. CODE § 43-29-80 (Supp. 1980); TENN. CODE ANN. §' 14-25-107(a) (Supp. 1980);
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ever, in the weight given to the protection of the client's rights in
these hearings. Alabama49 and South Carolina 0 authorize the
courts to issue ex parte protective orders without requiring a sub-
sequent adversary hearing. Connecticut similarly allows ex parte
appointment of a temporary conservator, but limits the term of
service to thirty days. 1
Depriving clients of their physical liberty, their right to make.
personal care decisions, and their right to control their property
for extended periods without an adversary hearing may violate the
due process clause of the fourteenth amendment. In Morrissey v.
Brewer,52 the United States Supreme Court held that the loss of
liberty entailed in parole revocation is a serious deprivation requir-
ing that the parolee be accorded notice and a hearing.53 In North
Georgia Finishing, Inc. v. Di-Chem, Inc.,5 the Court held that im-
pounding a bank account without notice or opportunity for an
early hearing violates the fourteenth amendment.5 These decisions
indicate that any substantial deprivation of liberty or property
must be preceded by notice and a hearing if due process is to be
satisfied.
Five states with emergency protective services legislation re-
quire some form of notice or hearing; however, the flexibility of the
statutory requirements for these safeguard procedures may render
them vulnerable to due process attacks as well. Florida56 and Ten-
nessee57 require a hearing, although only after an ex parte order
has been issued. Maryland,58 North Carolina,5 and Oklahoma60
provide even greater protection by requiring an expedited adver-
sarial hearing on notice before an emergency order can be issued.
In cases in which the delay caused by the minimal notice de-
manded for these hearings would seriously endanger the client,
Wis. STAT. ANN. § 55.05(4) (West Supp. 1980).
49. ALA. CODE § 38-9-5 (Supp. 1980).
50. S.C. CODE § 43-29-80 (Supp. 1979).
51. CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 45-72 (West Supp. 1980).
52. 408 U.S. 471 (1972).
53. Id. at 484-87.
54. 419 U.S. 601 (1975).
55. Id. at 606-08.
56. FLA. STAT. ANN. § 410.104(3) (West Supp. 1980).
57. TENN. CODE ANN. § 14-25-107(a) (1980).
58. MD. EST. & TRUsTs CODE ANN. § 13-709(f) (Supp. 1980).
59. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 108-106.2(b) (1978).
60. OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 43A, § 808(C) (West 1979).
May 1981] THE NEW PATERNALISM
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however, North Carolina permits waiver of notice,6 1 and Maryland
allows a police officer to transport a person immediately to a
health care facility for emergency medical care, although it re-
quires a petition for a court hearing to be filed within twenty-four
hours.
62
The Standards for Intervention
In addition to creating new court proceedings to authorize in-
tervention, the states in question have also established standards
for identifying candidates for protective services or protective
placement. Ten of the eleven states follow the same general statu-
tory pattern.63 First, certain behavioral disabilities are described,
61. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 108-106.3(d) (1978).
62. MD. EST. & TRUSTS CODE ANN. § 13-709(a) (Supp. 1980).
63. The following considerations are exemplary of the special criteria for identifying
candidates for protective services or for protective placement- behavior indicating mental
incapacity to provide adequate self-care because of physical or mental impairment which
has resulted in an inability to protect against abuse, neglect, or exploitation by others, and
absence of a "guardian or relative or other appropriate person able, willing and available to
assume the kind and degree of protection and supervision required under the circum-
stances," ALA. CODE § 38-9-2(1) (Supp. 1980); inability "to perform or obtain services which
are necessary to maintain physical and mental health," including "the provision of medical
care for physical and mental needs .. . assistance in personal hygiene, food, clothing, ade-
quately heated and ventilated shelter, protection from health and safety hazards, [and] pro-
tection from maltreatment," CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 46a-14(2)-(3) (West Supp. 1980);
"[o]rganic brain damage, advanced age, or other physical, mental or emotional dysfunction-
ing in connection therewith, to the extent that the person is substantially impaired in his
ability adequately to provide for his own care or protection," FLA. STAT. AN. § 410.102(1)
(West Supp. 1980); insufficient "understanding or capacity to make or communicate respon-
sible decisions concerning [oneself], including provisions for health care, food, clothing, or
shelter, because of any mental disability, senility, other mental weakness, disease, habitual
drunkenness, or addiction to drugs," MD. EST. & TRUST CODE ANN. § 13-705(b) (Supp.
1980); insufficient "understanding or capacity to make or communicate responsible decisions
concerning [oneself], including but not limited to provisions for health or mental health
care, food, clothing, or shelter, because of physical or mental incapacity," N.C. GEN. STAT. §
108-104(1) (Supp. 1979); physical or mental disability that has substantially impaired the
ability to provide adequately for one's own care or custody, OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 43A, §
803(4) (West Supp. 1980); inability to provide for one's own protection from abuse or neg-
lect by another or oneself, S.C. CODE § 43-29-30(1) (1976); inability to manage one's own
resources, carry out the activities of daily living, or protect oneself from neglect, hazardous
or abusive situations without assistance from others, TENN. CODE ANN. § 14-25-102(2)
(Supp. 1980); incapacity resulting from mental retardation, cerebral palsy, epilepsy, other
neurological conditions, infirmities of aging or other like incapacities resulting from acci-
dents, mental or physical disability, that prevents one from providing his or her own care
and protection, UTAH CODE ANN. § 55-19-1(1) (Supp. 1979); and "organic brain damage
caused by advanced age or other physical degeneration in connection therewith to the ex-
tent that the person so afflicted is substantially impaired in his ability to adequately provide
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such as inability to care for oneself adequately or to protect oneself
from abuse and exploitation by others. Next, a number of causes
for this incapacity are listed, most of which involve impairment of
mental function. "Infirmities of aging," "senility," or simply "ad-
vanced age" are terms commonly used to denote such impairment
in the elderly. In a few instances, physical impairment alone is
considered a sufficient basis for intervention when this condition
leads to self-neglect or victimization by others, regardless of the
client's mental competence."
These standards present several problems. First, the statutes
often define the concepts of self-neglect or abuse in general terms,
thereby allowing courts, agencies, and social workers too much
flexibility to disapprove of a client's eccentric behavior and to im-
pose on that person their personal views about a proper lifestyle.
By contrast, Connecticut refers more precisely to the person's in-
ability to obtain medical care for physical and mental health
needs, nutritious meals, clothing, safe and adequately heated and
ventilated shelter, and personal hygiene, as well as protection from
physical abuse or harm that endangers such person's health.15 Ma-
ryland"6 and New Hampshire6 7 also limit findings of incompetence
to circumstances in which a person is not able to provide for his or
her own food, clothing, shelter, health care, safety, or essential
needs of life.
New Hampshire attaches a further limitation to its list of
functional disabilities that justify intervention by requiring that
the person's incapacity must be evidenced by acts within six
months prior to the filing of the petition for guardianship, with at
least one incident occurring within twenty days before the filing."
This requirement focuses the court's attention on the actual func-
tional disabilities of the person and requires the petitioner to mar-
shal recent concrete evidence of such incapacity.
These definitions fall into two subcategories: (1) functional
for his own care or custody," Wis. STAT. ANN. § 55.01(3) (West Supp. 1980).
64. See ALA. CODE § 38-9-2(1) (Supp. 1980); CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 46a-14(2)-(3)
(West Supp. 1980); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 410.102(1) (West Supp. 1980); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit.
43A, § 803(4) (West Supp. 1980); S.C. Code § 43-29-30(1) (1979); TENN. CODE ANN. § 14-25-
102(2) (Supp. 1980); UTAH CODE ANN. § 55-19-1(1) (Supp. 1979).
65. CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 46-a-14(2)-(3) (West Supp. 1980).
66. MD. EST. & TRUSTS CODE ANN. § 13-705(b) (Supp. 1980).
67. N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 464-A.2(VII) (Supp. 1979).
68. Id. § 464-A:2(XI).
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definitions of current inability to cope; and (2) definitions of the
underlying conditions that cause these disabilities. When func-
tional definitions are used, one may ask whether involuntary inter-
vention should be permitted solely because severe functional inca-
pacity in providing for the necessities of life has been proven, or
whether one must always additionally show that some particular
condition, such as mental disorder or "the infirmities of aging," is
the underlying cause of the failure to act. The latter inquiry is the
traditional basis for all state guardianship laws and for all but New
Hampshire's protective services acts, presumably on the theory
that the parens patriae power should be exercised oily when a
person is unable to act rationally."9 Critics, however, have con-
tended that this position imposes a "medical model" of mental ill-
ness on guardianship proceedings, thereby fostering domination of
these proceedings by psychiatrists.7 0 It is better for a court to ex-
amine actual behavioral limitations of the client, the argument
runs, than to attempt to probe the control mechanisms of the
human mind.
The Uniform Probate Code attempts to address this problem,
but does not fully abandon the need to demonstrate a condition
causing the functional incapacity. The Code defines an incapaci-
tated person as one "who is impaired by reason of mental illness,
mental deficiency, physical illness or disability, advanced age,
chronic use of drugs, chronic intoxication, or other cause (except
minority) to the extent that he lacks sufficient understanding or
capacity to make or communicate responsible decisions concerning
his person. '71 Inability to engage in decisionmaking about matters
affecting one's person thus is seen as the core of the functional
disorder produced by a variety of conditions.
This formulation, however, introduces another complication.
Physical illness and disability, not just mental condition, are recog-
nized as causes of functional inability and therefore are logically
included in the definition. The problem with this approach is that
courts thereby are empowered to appoint guardians with impor-
tant powers over the person and the estate of adults who are men-
tally competent, yet physically incapacitated. Thus, a court could
69. See generally AimRIcAN BAR FOUNDATION, supra note 11, at 250.
70. See Horstman, supra note 15, at 225-30.
71. UNIFORM PROBATE CODE § 5-101(1). See generally Effland, Caring for the Elderly
Under the Uniform Probate Code, 17 ARIz. L. REv. 373 (1975).
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sanction an involuntary guardianship for an elderly stroke victim
who has lost the power to speak and write, but who is otherwise
mentally fit. Moreover, the Uniform Probate Code definition refers
to "responsible" decisionmaking, thereby allowing a court to evalu-
ate the merits of particular decisions by physically disabled but
mentally competent persons, and, if the court disagrees with them,
to find the person incapacitated and appoint a guardian.
The New Hampshire statute adopts a still more functional ap-
proach, stating explicitly that incapacity is a legal, not a medical
disability, to be measured only by functional limitations. 2 No
cause, mental or physical, for this disability must be proven. The
court need focus only on the specific evidence of the individual's
recent failure to provide various necessities of life for himself or
herself.
Both the Uniform Probate Code and the New Hampshire ap-
proaches may interfere with an individual's constitutional right to
privacy. Although the scope of this right as interpreted by the Su-
preme Court has been confined to cases involving reproductive
freedom,73 at least two state courts have extended the right to situ-
ations involving refusal of life support care by terminally ill pa-
tients or their representatives. 7 4 On similar constitutional grounds,
the right of voluntary, competent mental patients to refuse treat-
ment also has been recognized recently.75 These cases suggest that
the right to privacy includes the right of self-determination in im-
portant matters affecting one's person that do not infringe on the
rights of others. If so, then it follows that competent but physically
incapacitated persons are entitled to make their own personal care
decisions, including the decision to neglect themselves, without in-
terference from the state through involuntary protective services or
appointment of a guardian. The state's interest in preserving the
quality of the physically incapacitated person's life seems no
greater than its interest in forcibly promoting proper self-care in
any adult's life.
Interference with the rights of mentally competent persons
72. N.H. REv. STAT. ANN. § 474-A:2(XI) (Supp. 1979).
73. See Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973); Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S. 438 (1972);
Griswold v. State of Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965).
74. Suierintendent v. Saikewicz, 373 Mass. 728, 370 N.E.2d 417 (1977); In re Quinlan,
70 N.J. 10, 355 A.2d 647 (1976).
75. Rogers v. Okin, 478 F. Supp. 1342 (D. Mass. 1979), cert. granted, 49 U.S.L.W. 3779
(1981); Rennie v. Kline, 476 F. Supp. 1294 (D. N.J. 1979).
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also conflicts with the tradition that the state's exercise of its
power as parens patriae, on which both protective services acts
and guardianship laws rest, has always required a finding of some
form of mental incompetence when adults are the objects of pro-
tection.7 From its origin, the state's concern was for "idiots" and
"lunatics," authorizing guardianship for adults who lacked the
power of self-control.77 More recently, guardianship statutes have
been broadened to include alcoholics and addicts on the same ba-
sis-that such persons lack the power of self-control because of
chemical dependency.7 8 Thus, the Uniform Probate Code's exten-
sion of guardianship into the life of the mentally competent but
physically incapacitated person is unprecedented.
Some finding of mental incompetence, therefore, ought to be a
necessary component of protective services acts and guardianship
laws. The functional limitations of a client are important factors,
but mere failure to care for oneself, however recent the evidence,
should not obviate the need for a finding of mental incompetence.
New Hampshire and the Uniform Probate Code thus extend too
far in requiring only findings of functional limitations without any
need to show that such limitations are caused by mental disability.
The Role of the Public Agency
Most of the states provide for a "public guardianship, 7 9 that
is, court appointment of a public official or agency to implement a
protective services order or to serve as guardian of an incompetent
person, usually when no other private person or agency is available
or willing to assume this responsibility. Practical problems abound
in such guardianships. There may be a conflict of interest between
an agency's fiduciary responsibility to the client and its limited
fiscal authority as a public body to provide the services needed by
that client.80 The delegation of day-to-day guardianship duties to
various caseworkers within an agency may depersonalize a guardi-
76. See AmsmucA BAR FOUNDATION, supra note 11, at 250.
77. Id.
78. Id. at 252.
79. See Bell, Schmidt & Miller, Public Guardianship and the Elderly: Findings
From a National Study, 21 THE GERONTOLOGIST 194 (1981); Comment, Public Guardian-
ship, 2 LAw & HUMAN BEHAVIOR 267 (1978).
80. Bell, Schmidt & Miller, Public Guardianship and the Elderly: Findings From a
National Study, 21 THE GERONTOLOGIST 197 (1981).
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anship and negate any real personal fiduciary role.81 A heavy
caseload also may lead to the neglect of a client.82 Yet, none of the
states has addressed these problems in its legislation.
The need for special oversight of a public agency is critical
when the agency assumes complete power over a citizen's personal
life.83 Again, however, most states have ignored the issue. One ex-
ception is Maryland, where in each county a nine member Dis-
abled Persons Review Board semiannually reviews all public
guardianships and recommends to the court the continuation,
modification, or termination of the guardianship." A second
method has been adopted in Connecticut, which requires the pub-
lic guardian to prepare written plans for services to the disabled
client and to submit the plan to the regional ombudsman who has
the right to comment on the proposal.8 5 The effectiveness of both
methods of review, however, still remains to be evaluated.
The Due Process Model: A Failure?
The optimism of the proponents of due process reform in pro-
tective services legislation has not proven justified in the light of
current trends in state legislation. Serious procedural flaws exist in
the laws of Alabama, Florida, Oklahoma, and South Carolina, and
lesser weaknesses exist in several other states.88 The standards for
intervention are still vague and conclusory.87 Finally, the inter-
venor, even a public agency, is rarely accountable to anyone, in-
cluding the court, once the court has signed the order.88 The result
has been that protective services, especially when provided by a
public agency, are becoming in many states a mechanism to allow
the public agency to assume total dominion over elderly clients.8 9
A movement that promised to foster independence for the frail
elderly client may become the vehicle for creating abject depen-
dence on the public agency and its caseworkers. Admittedly, these
conclusions are based only on a statutory analysis and do not take
81. Id. at 200.
82. Id.
83. Id. at 197.
84. MD. ANN. CODE art. 88A, § 110 (1979).
85. CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 46a-16(a) (West Supp. 1980).
86. See text accompanying notes 33-37, 48-51 supra.
87. See text accompanying notes 63-78 supra.
88. See text accompanying notes 38-40 supra.
89. See text accompanying notes 79-85 supra.
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into account agency regulations and practice, which may impose
controls not apparent in the statutes. Nonetheless, the opportunity
for oppression of the elderly must be recognized. 90
The Abolitionist Model
Some commentators have opposed adult protective services
programs from the outset, seeing in them the heavy hand of a pa-
ternalistic state taking over people's lives in the name of benevo-
lence. One author, for example, roundly condemns these programs:
[I]nvoluntary guardianship emerges as an official initiation rite of
the poor and the inept .... The price extracted from those who
are dependent on public assistance is manipulation by the man-
aged state; coerced membership is facilitated by the increasing
"medicalization" of human and societal problems. Involuntary
guardianship, when used to impose forms of state assistance, is
but one outgrowth of a medical model of human activity. Within
this frame of reference, failure to achieve accepted norms of be-
havior is seen as symptomatic of a person's diseased state. Conse-
quently, what might be regarded as a public social problem can
easily be viewed and dealt with as a private medical problem, ne-
cessitating a medical or pseudomedical solution.91
Even when guardianship is assumed by private persons, another
commentator, Professor Alexander believes the practice is funda-
mentally wrong: "In a society which venerates liberty, conservator-
ship is an anachronism. Neither the interest of potential benefi-
ciaries nor the interest of the state in having a better management
position vis-a-vis the ward is justified." 92
The "abolitionist" position thus opposes not only protective
services programs, but guardianship itself. The premises of this po-
sition and its practical implications in the lives of the frail elderly
need to be explored. The abolitionist model rests on a belief that
no such condition as mental incompetency exists. It is postulated
90. In the forty jurisdictions that do not have protective services laws, intervention is
controlled by guardianship law and agency regulations. Because comparatively few of these
states have adopted the Uniform Probate Code, the likelihood of abuse of the elderly
through inappropriate guardianships remains very high. Many state legislatures nonetheless
have been reluctant to reform guardianship law along due process lines.
91. Mitchell, The Objects of Our Wisdom and Our Coercion: Involuntary Guardian-
ship for Incompetents, 52 S. CAL. L. REV. 1405, 1448 (1979) (footnotes omitted). See also
Mitchell, Involuntary Guardianship for Incompetents: A Strategy for Legal Services Advo-
cates, 12 CLEARINGHOUSE RV. 451, 462 (1978).
92. Alexander, Who Benefits from Conservatorship?, TaRmA, 30, 32 (May, 1977).
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that mental illness is really only behavior that deviates from soci-
ety's norms for acceptable conduct,93 and that psychiatry has cre-
ated various diagnostic labels for such conduct and has branded it
as pathological, much as medicine has done for physical disease."
This basis of the "abolitionist" view goes further than merely chas-
tising those who determine mental illness; it denies the existence
of mental illness entirely. Only behavior actually and objectively
physically harmful to society should be punished by law. A mere
prediction of such conduct on grounds of mental illness ought
never to be the basis for involuntary treatment or institutionaliza-
tion, or for usurpation of the person's powers of self-determination
over property and person.
Assuming paternalistic intervention is unjustified, the ques-
tion arises as to what system, if any, should replace it. If guardian-
ship laws ought to be repealed, it is unclear what arrangements, if
any, should be made to deal with extreme cases of self-neglect.
Should the confused elderly person be left to wander the streets or
die of malnutrition or freeze to death? The "abolitionist," unfortu-
nately, has not moved beyond a condemnation of protective ser-
vices programs. Instead of proposing new alternatives, proponents
of this approach offer only another version of the "due process"
model95 subsequent to having condemned it. The failure of the
commentators advocating the "abolitionist" model to address the
implications of that position leads one to suspect that the nonin-
terventionist world of the future, in which all help must be freely
chosen by the client, is really only an ideological fantasy emanating
from a neo-conservative revival of laissez-faire individualism.
Some proponents of the abolitionist model oppose protective
services because they involve government-initiated intervention,
however benevolently motivated. Logically, then, these commenta-
tors should believe that protective services programs, but not all
private guardianships, should be abandoned. Yet, again, when
93. See generally T. SzAsz, LAW, LMERTY AND PsycmATY (1963); Szasz, Civil Liber-
ties and the Mentally Ill, 9 CLE V.-MAR. L. REv. 399 (1960).
94. See generally Horstman, supra note 15, at 225-30. This position should not be
confused with that of many legal advocates who believe psychiatrists have improperly
usurped the role of judges and juries in civil commitment and guardianship proceedings.
See, e.g., G. ALEXANDER & T. LEwiN, THE AAD D TEm NEED FOR SURROGATE MANAGEMENT
18 (1972).
95. Alexander, Who Benefits from Conservatorship?, TRAWL at 32 (May, 1977); Mitch-
ell, Involuntary Guardianship for Incompetents: A Strategy for Legal Services Advocates,
12 CLEARINGHOUSE Rv. 451, 467 (1978).
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faced with the need to develop alternatives to these programs, the
commentators thus far only suggest greater affirmative efforts at
reforming the existing system through litigation and media public-
ity.96 It would be more consistent to advocate legislative action
prohibiting public agencies or officials from serving as guardians or
as parties to petitions for guardianship.
The Voluntary Service Approach
The crucial difficulty in the protective services movement may
be its heavy emphasis on involuntary intervention and its corre-
sponding failure to explore and promote methods of providing vol-
untary assistance to the elderly. The early proponents of protective
services thought the power to obtain surrogate decisionmaking au-
thority was essential for the program. 7 This belief may have been
founded on a suspicion that the client would resist the offer of ser-
vices unless the threat of court-ordered intervention loomed in the
background. Mechanisms and procedures for providing strictly vol-
untary services, even to mentally disabled clients, have received
relatively little attention.
Among the proposals that have surfaced are the use of friend-
advocates for the elderly and of agents appointed by the person
needing assistance.98 The latter idea has been expanded by Profes-
sor Alexander into a suggestion that legislatures use probate law to
create a "living will"-a document that would allow individuals to
direct the management of their property in case of future incompe-
tency.9 The proposal resembles in some respects the Extended
Power of Attorney Model Law proposed by the Uniform Law
Commissioners. oo
96. See Mitchell, Involuntary Guardianship for Incompetents: A Strategy for Legal
Services Advocates, 12 CLEARINGHOUSE REV. 451, 467-68 (1978).
97. D. LEHMANN & G. MATHIASEN, GUARDIANSHIP AND PROTECTIVE SERVICES FOR OLDER
PEOPLE 115 (1963); G. HALL, OVERCOMING BARRIERS TO PROTECTIVE SERVICES 5 (1968).
98. See E. Cohen, Protective Services and Public Guardianship: A Dissenting View
11 (unpublished paper presented at the 31st Annual Meeting of the Gerontological Society,
Nov. 20, 1978) (on file with Hastings Law Journal).
99. See G. ALEXANDER, PREMATURE PROBATE: A DIFFERENT PERSPECTIVE ON GuARDi-
ANSHIP FOR THE ELDERLY 1008, 1018 (1979).
100. See UNIFORM PROBATE CODE § 5-501. Section 5-501 provides that a person may
expressly confer authority on an attorney or agent to act for the principal notwithstanding




Professor Halper has summarized the problems in devising a
sensible public policy towards the needs of the elderly, stating:
[E]ven when fortunate enough to avoid such dangers, the elder
may find his freedom a useless possession, for of what value is
liberty to one buffetted by the violent inner winds of the mind?
Does not liberty presume a minimum level of rationality and ma-
turity (which is why, for example, children are not free to bind
themselves through contracts) that the seriously mentally ill sim-
ply do not possess? ... Can the deteriorations of aging be dis-
missed with the fatuity that growing old is a psychosomatic or
sociosomatic illness? Is the romanticization of the incompetent
aged a tribute to their humanity or merely a means of exploiting
their weakness for ideological purposes? If it is true that with the
best of intentions it may be difficult to determine who requires
the help and protection of the state, does this amount to conced-
ing that no one needs it unless he first asks for it? Or is this
merely a rationalization for a callous evasion of responsibility?
... The questions attack en masse, and, like feeding wolves, in
slashing bites devour the flesh of our certitudes. 101
If the "due process" approach has been largely ignored by the
states, and if "abolitionist" views need more explanation and de-
velopment, in what direction should public policy proceed? As a
first step, states should impose a moratorium on the use by public
agencies of guardianships or of orders for protective services, pro-
tective placement, or emergency services. Second, the energies and
resources currently used in securing and implementing these forms
of involuntary intervention should be channeled instead into vol-
untary assistance programs. Social services agencies need to find
ways through creative casework to win client confidence and thus
the client's consent to the recommended services. If the agency
comes to realize that involuntary intervention is no longer possible,
the incidence of uncooperative clients may tend to decrease and
the need for involuntary intervention may drop dramatically.
State legislatures must also recognize the need to review these
laws. Reform of state guardianship laws to eliminate substantive
and procedural defects should be pressed vigorously. More impor-
tantly, states should focus their efforts on creating legal mecha-
nisms whereby the citizen can make binding arrangements for con-
101. Halper, The Double-Edged Sword: Paternalism as a Policy in the Problems of
Aging, 58 MMBANK MEMORAL FuND Q. 472, 487 (1980).
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trol of his or her person and property in advance of the onset of
any mental incapacity. 10 2 Only after legislative reform has taken
place and public agencies have perfected techniques for voluntary
intervention can the moratorium on involuntary intervention be
safely brought to an end.
102. See text accompanying notes 98-100 supra.
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